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A "Reasonable" Approach to Resource
Development in Outer Space
Each era of history progresses to a point at which it is eligible to wrestle
with the great problem of that period. For the ancient Greeks it was the
organization of society; for the Romans it was the organization of em-
pire, for the medievalists the spelling out of their relationship to God;
for the men of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the mastery of the
oceans; and for us it is the determination of how mankind can live in
harmony on this finite globe while establishing relationships to infinite
space. I
I. INTRODUCTION
Even with the limited amount of space exploration conducted
thus far, scientists have discovered that outer space is rich with natu-
ral resources. In addition, some of the identified resources are ones
which are becoming dangerously scarce here on earth. With existing
technology, it is possible to exploit 2 these "space resources,"' 3 trans-
port them to earth, and relieve a good deal of the burden that we now
place on the earth for our support. 4 These resources can also be used
to maintain many space-based projects that are now contemplated. 5
1. J. Michener, Symposium: The Role of Private Enterprise in Outer Space-Interna-
tional Legal Implications, 2 Hous. J. INT'L L. 1 (1980).
2. The word "exploitation" in this Comment is not used in the pejorative sense. Rather,
exploitation is meant to refer to development of resources in hopes that they may be put to a
more productive use.
3. The term "space resources" as used in this Comment refers to the material resources
found on the surfaces and interiors of the lunar and celestial bodies.
4. See infra note 56 and accompanying text.
5. Although the explosion of the space shuttle Challenger, in January 1986, was a major
setback to the United States' space program, there are still many space projects in progress, on
the drawing table, and in the minds of scientists. Those projects that appear to be possible in
the near future include: the design and deployment of a United States space station, the estab-
lishment of a permanent scientific base on the moon, and development of the controversial
Strategic Defense Initiative. T. MCDONOUGH, SPACE-THE NEXT TWENTY-FIVE YEARS 97-
101 (1987).
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration has plans for even more ambitious
projects. Among these plans are manned expeditions to Mars and the Martian moon Phobos.
Cook, The New Frontiers, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 26, 1988, at 50-56.
The Soviet Union also has space plans. The Soviet space stations, SOYUZ and MIR, are
presently orbiting the earth. Like the United States, the Soviets intend to explore Mars and
Phobos. Smith, Future Soviet Space Exploration to Focus on Mars, Asteroids, AVIATION WEEK
& SPACE TECH., June 22, 1987, at 81-85.
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Overall, the wealth of outer space resources and our present ability to
tap into them will help meet the world's increasing resource demand.
Although a presence in space has the potential to bring tremen-
dous benefit to our terrestrial environment, it also has equal potential
for being a source of considerable hostility. History teaches us that
whenever disputes arise over large quantities of resources or large
tracts of land, conflict is virtually inevitable.6  The source of is .hos-
tility will be those states7 that are presently incapable of venturing
into space due to technological or economic deficiencies. 8
Due to the overwhelming global importance of this issue, inter-
national guidelines must be created that will determine the manner in
which space resources can be obtained and utilized. Such guidelines
must be truly international in order to command respect in the inter-
national community. These guidelines must also emphasize a fair sys-
tem of allocating the benefits of space. Whatever form these
guidelines take, the underlying philosophy should be one of compro-
mise to ensure both that all the benefits of outer space are realized,
and to alleviate the concerns of states that do not have a space pro-
gram 9 who may believe that other states will ignore their interests in
exploration and exploitation of space.
At least one set of guidelines exists today. On December 5, 1979,
the United Nations adopted "The Agreement Governing the Activi-
ties of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies" ("Moon
Treaty"). '0 The Moon Treaty is the last of five space-related treaties"
that the United Nations has promulgated and the only agreement that
6. In the late 1800s, range wars were commonplace between cattlemen and sheep ranch-
ers who were competing for grazing privileges on public lands. T. LARSON, HISTORY OF WYO-
MING 369-72 (1965). The gold rush in California also spawned its share of violence. W. BECK
& D. WILLIAMS, CALIFORNIA-A HISTORY OF THE GOLDEN STATE 172-79 (1972).
7. The term "states". is being used in this Comment, as it is used in all of the United
Nations space treaties, to refer to countries.
8. For a list of those states that have significant space capabilities, see infra note 78, at
71-74. Most other states possess very limited, if any, potential for space presence in the near
future.
9. See infra note 78.
10. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bod-
ies, opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979, G.A. Res. 34/68, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at
77, U.N. Doc. A34/46 (1979), reprinted in 7 J. SPACE L. 165 (1979) [hereinafter "Moon
Treaty"].
11. The other four space related treaties that the United Nations has drafted are:
(1) Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, opened for signature Jan. 27,
1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205;
(2) Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of
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specifically attempts to define a legal structure to regulate the devel-
opment of space resources. 12 The Moon Treaty evolved over a con-
siderable period of time 13 and, after much debate, the United Nations
finally reached consensus. 14 Many commentators believe the Moon
Treaty is an equitable agreement for the space powers as well as for
technologically-deficient states.15 However, other commentators con-
Objects Launched into Outer Space, opened for signature Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570,
T.I.A.S. No. 6599, 672 U.N.T.S. 119;
(3) Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, opened
for signature Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S. No. 7762;
(4) Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, opened for signa-
ture Jan. 14, 1975, 28 U.S.T. 695, T.I.A.S. No. 8480.
12. Halket, Savage, Leister, Lephert, and Miller, Report on the Proposed Agreement Gov-
erning the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 23 JURIMETRICS 259
(1983) [hereinafter Halket].
13. In 1970, Argentina submitted the first draft agreement on the principles governing
activities concerning the use of natural resources found on the moon and other celestial bodies.
Cheng, The Moon Treaty: Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies within the Solar System Other than the Earth, December 18, 1979, 33 CUR-
RENT LEGAL PRoBS. 213, 214-15 (1986). The Argentine proposal proclaimed that all natural
resources located in outer space were the common heritage of mankind. Id. at 214. Any
benefits derived from the exploitation of such resources were to be used to promote higher
standards of living and to encourage economic and social development. Id.
A year later, the Soviet Union presented its own version of a draft treaty. The Soviet
proposal bore very little resemblance to that of Argentina's earlier proposal. The Soviets
placed no restrictions on the exploitation or use of space resources. Id. at 214-15.
In 1971, both the Argentine and Soviet proposals were used by the United Nations Com-
mittee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space ("COPUOS") in order to begin drafting its own
agreement. COPUOS did not reach agreement on the Moon Treaty until 1979. Id. at 215.
14. From its inception, COPUOS recognized that it was dealing in an entirely new area
which was extremely important to all states. The committee decided that the most authorita-
tive method of addressing, understanding and solving the complex issues was to use a process
of decision-making known as "consensus." Hosenball, The United Nations Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. Past Accomplishments and Future Challenges, 7 J. SPACE L. 95,
96 (1979). Consensus is a method used to reach agreement without actually voting. It is a
process where all states attempt to negotiate and reconcile their differing viewpoints until they
achieve an understanding which is not objectionable to any of the participating states. Gallo-
way, Consensus Decisionmaking by the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space, 7 J. SPACE L. 3 (1979). Reaching agreement by consensus is believed to ensure
maximum compliance because each state has had a stake in the decision. COPUOS has used
this method to achieve agreement on all five space treaties.
Although consensus was reached in 1979, United Nations procedures required five states
to sign and ratify the treaty before it could enter into force. In contrast to the four preceding
space treaties, states did not rush to sign the Moon Treaty. The fifth state did not deposit an
instrument of ratification with the United Nations, allowing the treaty to enter into force, until
July 11, 1984. The treaty is only binding on those states who have signed and ratified it.
Christol, The Moon Treaty Enters Into Force, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 163 (1985).
15. E.g., Christol, The Common Heritage of Mankind Provision in the 1979 Agreement
Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and other Celestial Bodies, 14 INT'L LAW 429
(1980).
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tend that the treaty is flawed and will completely inhibit the exploita-
tion of space resources.16
This Comment takes a critical look at the crucial paragraphs of
the Moon Treaty and explain why they are likely to be ineffective. In
addition, this Comment proposes and discusses an alternative ap-
proach for the acquisition and management of space resources. This
alternative approach hinges on an analogy to the legal doctrine of
"reasonable use," 17 a theory based on principles developed in the late
nineteenth century. This theory is currently used to settle disputes
over scarce water resources in the western United States. The reason-
able use doctrine, as applied to outer space resources, would strike a
balance between the encouragement of space exploration and the need
for assuaging the concerns of those states that lack the present tech-
nology or economic means to exploit space.
II. THE NEED FOR AN ALTERNATE SOURCE OF NATURAL
RESOURCES
The development of space resources is not being pursued simply
for the sake of accomplishment nor is it merely a full-employment
program for the world's scientists. Rather, an immediate and genuine
need exists for finding alternative sources to replace the natural re-
sources currently found on earth.' 8
The diminishing supply of energy resources best demonstrates
the need to locate alternate resource reserves. The world relies mainly
on fossil fuels for its energy needs. 19 Coal is the most abundant of the
fossil fuels. 20 Scientists believe that coal reserves are twenty-six times
greater than those of oil.21 Although coal reserves are plentiful, major
disadvantages are associated with using coal as a primary energy
source. Coal mining disrupts the landscape and is regarded as a very
16. See Rosenfield, The Moon Treaty. The United States Should Not Become a Party, 74
AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 152, 162 (1981); see Note, Extraterrestrial Law on the Final Fron-
tier: A Regime to Govern the Development of Celestial Body Resources, 71 GEO. L.J. 1427
(1983).
17. For a discussion of the reasonable use doctrine, see infra notes 171-177 and accompa-
nying text.
18. See infra text accompanying note 31.
19. D. HEDLEY, WORLD ENERGY, THE FACTS AND THE FUTURE 26 (1981).
20. S. CUrER, H. RENWICK & W. RENWICK, EXPLOITATION, CONSERVATION, PRES-
ERVATION-A GEOGRAPHIC PERSPECTIVE ON NATURAL RESOURCE USE 368 (1985) [herein-
after GEOGRAPHIC PERSPECTIVE].
21. D. HEDLEY, supra note 19, at 42.
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dirty, expensive,22 and inconvenient source of energy.23 For these rea-
sons, the use of coal as an energy resource has lessened.
Oil and natural gas are two other common energy sources.
24
Although oil and natural gas are more versatile than coal,25 they, like
most other energy resources, only exist in limited quantities. 26 In
1979, experts estimated that, given existing consumption rates, the
world's proven oil reserves would last for only twenty-eight years.
27
As bleak as this estimate sounds, the actual situation may be worse
than originally expected. Oil consumption is continuing to increase,
especially in developing nations. Moreover, the Organization of Pe-
troleum Exporting Countries, which controls most of the world's oil
reserves, has left no doubt by its past conduct that it is willing to
hoard its exploitable reserves in order to influence oil prices.
28
Experts estimate that all of the world's proven energy reserves
29
are capable of lasting a mere forty more years.30 Although fossil fuels
have taken millions of years to form, the supply can be exhausted in a
very short period of time. One energy expert emphasized the immedi-
acy of the energy shortage:
[T]he world really is running out of the fuels which built the highly
technological world of today. Within a period which, seen in the
perspective of the time taken to form our fossil fuels, would ap-
proximate to a few seconds, there will be very little oil, natural gas
or coal left . . . [These] few seconds, this eye blink of geological
time is all that stands between us and the end of the world as we
know it.
3 1
22. Id. at 41-42. The major cost-drivers are the construction of approximately 700 new
mines and the building of miles of slurry pipelines, new trains, barges, and coal carts. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 23-24.
25. GEOGRAPHIC PERSPECTIVE, supra note 20, at 361. Oil has several advantages over
coal. Oil is less expensive to mine, easier to transport, more adaptable to different uses and has
a higher energy content. D. HEDLEY, supra note 19, at 41. Once discovered, natural gas
possesses many of the same advantages oil has over coal. Id. at 49.
26. D. HEDLEY, supra note 19, at 34.
27. Id. at 57.
28. Id.
29. Energy reserves consist of all fossil fuels (oil, coal, natural gas, oil shale and tar sands)
and uranium sources. Id.
30. Id. For some states, the situation would be even more threatening if they were forced
to depend solely upon their own natural resources. Western Europe's energy reserves would
last only twelve years. Japan has the lowest reserves/consumption ratio in the world, because
of its inordinate consumption and almost complete lack of indigenous energy reserves. Id. at
31. Id. at 35.
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Many people regard nuclear power as part of the solution to the
world's energy crisis.32 Nuclear fission is generally regarded as the
cheapest method for generating electricity 33 and nuclear fuel is plenti-
ful. 3 4 The potential of nuclear power is tremendous, but for chiefly
three reasons, its use has been curtailed. First, its use has been cur-
tailed because of the possible harm associated with using nuclear en-
ergy. The likelihood of a failure at a nuclear facility is not great,35 but
concerns exist that even a single malfunction could have extremely
grave consequences. 36 Second, the safe disposal of radioactive waste
presents a problem.37 Finally, nuclear power is a sensitive political
issue by virtue of its association with nuclear weapons.38
32. Id. at 73.
33. Id. at 74.
34. The United States is self-sufficient in uranium. GEOGRAPHIC PERSPECTIVE, supra
note 20, at 386.
35. Probability calculations indicate that nuclear reactor risks are less than those that we
routinely accept from airplane crashes and a host of natural disasters. NUCLEAR POWER:
BOTH SIDES 85 (M. Kaku & J. Trainer ed. 1982). Most analysts, even anti-nuclear ones,
believe that the risk from nuclear power plants is probably much less than the risk from burn-
ing coal. Nero, Safe Enough, in NUCLEAR POWER: BOTH SIDES 90 (M. Kaku & J. Trainer ed.
1982). The chances that a nuclear accident will cause latent fatalities is about one in half a
million reactor-years. The danger of immediate deaths is far less. There is one in a billion
reactor-years chance that an accident would cause immediate deaths as a result of large radia-
tion exposure. Id.
36. The possible effects of a nuclear accident are devastating. If the weather were
favorable and evacuation plans were well-executed, the number of early deaths due to radia-
tion exposure may be limited to a few hundred persons. However, radioactive materials would
be blown over thousands of square miles. Persons exposed to lesser amounts of radiation
would suffer from nausea while thousands of cancer deaths would result years later. Addition-
ally, food and water supplies within a thousand miles of the accident site would be contami-
nated. Court systems would become overcrowded with lawsuits due to the resulting damage.
The Price-Anderson Act places a ceiling on the liability from a nuclear accident to a maximum
recovery of $560 million. This sum would be grossly inadequate as evidenced by the govern-
ment's estimate that a large meltdown would give rise to at least $17 billion in property claims
(in 1965 dollars). Beya, Second Thoughts, in NUCLEAR POWER: BOTH SIDES 102-03 (M.
Kaku & J. Trainer ed. 1982).
On April 26, 1986, a fire damaged the reactor at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in the
Soviet Union causing the most devastating nuclear accident in history. Norman & Dickson,
SCIENCE, Sept. 12, 1986, at 12. The effects of the accident can only be estimated, however, up
to 5,300 deaths could occur from direct exposure to the radiation that was released and up to
30,000 to 40,000 persons could die of cancer due to indirect radiation exposure. The food
supply in the western Soviet Union and the neighboring states has also been contaminated. In
Norway, hundreds of thousands of reindeer must be slaughtered to prevent their contaminated
meat from entering the food chain. Increased levels of radiation have also been detected in the
fish, sheep, livestock and crops in the area. Chernobyl.- New Estimates of Death-Concerns for
the Food Chain, ENV'T, Sept. 1986, at 22.
37. D. HEDLEY, supra note 19, at 75.
38. Id.
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Energy sources are not the only terrestrial resources that are be-
coming scarce. Poor land management has allowed erosion to wash
away huge quantities of fertile soil. 39 In addition, each year new con-
struction removes large amounts of fertile soil from available farm-
land.40  For example, forests4 I are shrinking at an alarming rate.4 2
This is especially true in the lesser-developed parts of the world,
where the population completely depends upon the forests.4 3 Studies
indicate that as much as 0.6% of forest lands are destroyed each
year.44
The world community has recognized the gravity of the resource
problem on earth and has responded with the formulation of the
World Conservation Strategy ("WCS").45 The WCS formulates inter-
national policy to improve conservation efficiency and integrates con-
servation principles with needed development. 46  To achieve its
objectives, the WCS advocates more thoughtful cropland manage-
ment, protection of watershed forests and fisheries, tighter controls on
pollution, and promotion of genetic diversity among plants and ani-
mals. 47 Reducing demand for natural resources is also an important
aspect of conservation. 48 However, the WCS's approach of squeezing
as much use out of existing resources does not comprise a total solu-
tion to the problem.
39. R. ALLEN, How To SAVE THE WORLD-STRATEGY FOR WORLD CONSERVATION
12 (1980).
40. Id. Each year, the United States and Canada destroy 1.2 million acres of farmland in
order to build roads, buildings, and reservoirs. Farmland is disappearing at such an alarming
rate that one-third of the world's cropland will be destroyed over the next twenty years if
current rates of land degradation continue. Id. at 34.
41. The main uses of forest resources include: fuel, construction materials, paper, wildlife
habitat, and erosion control. GEOGRAPHIC PERSPECTIVE, supra note 20, at 157.
42. SECRETARIAT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANI-
TARIAN ISSUES, INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ISSUES,
THE VANISHING FOREST-THE HUMAN CONSEQUENCES OF DEFORESTATION 15-16 (1986).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 16.
45. The WCS was prepared by the International Union for Conservation of Nature and
Natural Resources with the support of several international organizations including the United
Nations and the World Wildlife Fund. R. ALLEN, supra note 39, at 10.
46. Id. at 23.
47. Id. at 26.
48. Affluent states are responsible for consuming a disproportionate share of natural re-
sources. For example, on average one Swiss citizen consumes as much as forty Somalis. R.
ALLEN, supra note 39, at 19. The United States, with only 6% of the world's population,
consumes 35% of the world's energy each year. Conversely, China has 21% of the world's
population and consumes only 6% of the world's energy. GEOGRAPHIC PERSPECTIVE, supra
note 20, at 358.
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With the projected swell in world population,49 resource con-
sumption will continue to increase. Further, no matter how efficient
technology allows us to become in expending resources, a large por-
tion of terrestrial resources are finite and will inevitably run out.50
Even if natural resources were limitless, the development of resources
often results in irreversible pollution of the environment.51 In addi-
tion to puliion, development invariably leave-. sc.ars whh dimini-h
the aesthetic qualities of the environment. 5
2
The options available to remedy these pressing problems are few.
Although much can be accomplished to conserve earth's resources,
the only feasible long term solution may be to search beyond the earth
for additional resources.
III. THE MOON AND OTHER CELESTIAL BODIES POSSESS MANY
OF THE RESOURCES THAT ARE GROWING
SCARCE ON EARTH
Given the global recognition of the growing scarcity of natural
resources and the permanent damage that development of these re-
sources is causing to the environment, the question arises whether the
vastness of outer space holds viable answers to the pressing problems
of earthly resource depletion. The short answer to this question is
yes; at least in theory, humans can exploit the resources available in
nearby celestial bodies.5 3 Although there is no guarantee that space
49. In 1977, President Carter initiated The Global 2000 Study which examined the future
implications of current global trends in population, natural resources and the environment.
The study concluded that rapid world growth will continue into the 21st century and esti-
mated that the world's population in the year 2000 will be 6.35 billion. Speth, The Global 2000
Report to the President, 8 B.C. ENVTL. L. REV. 695, 696 (1980). At present growth rates, the
world's population will reach ten billion by the year 2030. Id. at 703. A 1969 finding of the
United States National Academy of Sciences stated that a world population of ten billion is
close to, or above, the earth's carrying capacity. The Global 2000 Study raised suspicions that
the Academy of Sciences, in discounting certain global problems, may have overestimated the
earth's carrying capacity. Id. at 702-03.
50. See supra notes 19-31 and accompanying text.
51. On March 24, 1989 the Exxon tanker Valdez ran aground on a reef in the Prince
William Sound of Valdez, Alaska, causing the worst oil spill in United States' history. L.A.
Times, Mar. 25, 1989, part I, at 1, col. 4. Although damage was not as catastrophic as origi-
nally believed, the spill is still expected to cause significant harm to the bird and marine popu-
lations in the area. The extent of damage will not be fully known for years. L.A. Times, Mar.
31, 1989, part I, at 24, col. 4.
52. Coal mining is very disruptive to the environment because not only can it cause sulfu-
ric acid to pollute ground water and streams, but it can also create subsidence which damages
the overlying buildings and land. GEOGRAPHIC PERSPECTIVE, supra note 20, at 374.
53. See infra note 73 and accompanying text.
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will contain all the resources needed on earth, the moon and asteroids
contain enormous stockpiles of natural resources.5 4 A well-respected
United States scientist wrote, "[space contains] quantities of minerals
beyond the dreams of an earthly miner.""5
The United States' Apollo missions and Soviet missions to the
moon allowed scientists to acquire samples of the lunar soil.56 Tests
of soil samples and examination of survey data have revealed a variety
of metals, 57 silicon and calcium. 58 Further exploration and analysis of
the moon may reveal additional useful materials and resources. Two
experts commenting on the lunar resources have stated that "more
than 90 percent of the materials required for a complex industrial so-
ciety are available from average lunar soil with little or no
enrichment." 5 9
In addition to use on earth, space resources could also prove ex-
tremely valuable for space-based projects. For example, the low-grav-
ity condition of the moon makes it an attractive location for long-term
industrial development of space.60 The moon's low gravity environ-
ment significantly reduces the amount of energy required to perform a
similar task on earth. 61
This energy savings means that it would be cheaper and easier to
get resources into space from the moon than from earth.62 A current
potential obstacle may be that water and oxygen have not yet been
discovered in space. Oxygen and water are relatively heavy and ex-
pensive to launch into space from earth.63 However, scientists are ad-
dressing this problem by designing lunar orbiters that are capable of
detecting water.64 Once water is located, oxygen can then be sepa-
54. T. MCDONOUGH, supra note 5, at 90.
55. Id. at 4.
56. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, 96TH
CONG., 2D SESS., AGREEMENT GOVERNING THE ACTIVITIES OF STATES ON THE MOON AND
OTHER CELESTIAL BODIES, Part 4, 414 (Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter SENATE COMM.].
57. Metals that have been detected in the lunar soil are: iron, nickel, titanium and chro-
mium. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 416.
60. T. McDONOUGH, supra note 5, at 98. See also Note, The International Law of Outer
Space and its Effect on Commercial Space Activity, 11 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 521, 524 (1984);
Note, The Moon Treaty, 9 J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 281, 282 (1980).
61. T. McDONOUGH, supra note 5, at 98.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 100.
64. Id. at 100-01.
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rated from hydrogen for breathing. 65 Additionally, lunar rocks con-
tain oxides which can be transformed into oxygen. 66
Although experts know less about asteroids than about the
moon, they believe asteroids may be another potential source of space
resources.67 Asteroids are found mainly between the orbits of Mars
and Jupiter. 68 Preliminary studies indicate that a variety of minerals 69
and metals/u may be found on the surfaces of asteroids7r Asteroids
are considered to be the most accessible objects, other than the moon,
in the solar system.72 Thus, asteroids may have the potential to be a
significant and attractive source of space resources.
Surprisingly, the main barrier to exploiting space resources on
the moon and asteroids is not technical, but economic. 73 Exploring,
charting, and developing these resources will require a substantial in-
vestment. 74 The size of the actual investment will depend on the de-
mand for space resources and the cost of processing and transporting
those resources compared to the cost of developing similar resources
on earth. 75 As depletion of earth's resources and degradation of its
environment continue, the economic feasibility of capturing space re-
sources may become more appealing. 76
IV. THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL GUIDELINES THAT
CONTROL AND MONITOR THE ACQUISITION
OF SPACE RESOURCES
Some may assert that there is no need to devise regulations de-
tailing the manner in which space resources can be developed. 77 This
laissez-faire approach suggests that those who shoulder the tremen-
dous financial burden and bear the physical risks of space exploration
should be able to make an unbridled profit from their investment in
65. Id. at 100.
66. Id. at 98.
67. SENATE COMM., supra note 56, at 418.
68. Id. at 414.
69. Minerals that have been identified thus far are olivine, pyroxene, plagioclase, metallic
iron, clays, and opaque constituents. Id. at 417.
70. Metals that have been identified as being present on asteroids are: nickel, cobalt, gal-
lium, copper, germanium, and platinum. Id.
71. Id. at 417-18.
72. Id. at 417.
73. Id. at 419-20.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 418.
76. Id. at 419.
77. See Note, supra note 16, at 1431.
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space. This view opens up the riches of space on a first-come first-
serve basis and has significant appeal, from the space powers' 78 stand-
point. However, it is simply not a workable solution in today's inter-
national climate.
Presently, the actions of most states generally have international
consequences. This is because over the preceding decades the world
has become a global village. The time it takes to travel around the
world is now measured in hours rather than months. Satellites make
it possible for us to know of events in foreign lands in a fraction of a
second. 79 Consumers can purchase products manufactured around
the world in nearby convenience stores. 80 These are examples of how
a global interdependence has arisen among states. States can no
longer merely look at the domestic impact of their own actions be-
cause such actions increasingly have a global impact. Likewise, devel-
oping space resources will also have a global impact. Logically, then,
efforts to develop space resources should be governed by international
law.
V. MOON TREATY: AN APPROACH THAT MAY INHIBIT
EXPLOITATION OF SPACE RESOURCES
To adequately understand the ensuing criticism of the Moon
Treaty, it is first necessary to discuss the evolution of the treaty from
its inception to its final adoption in 1979.
A. The Moon Treaty Background
The United States' lunar landing in July 1969, coupled with the
retrieval of lunar soil by the Soviet Union years before, prompted a
flurry of activity within the United Nations. 81 Because the 1967
78. Although over forty states are active in space exploration, relatively few have access
to space. The United States and the Soviet Union are clearly the leaders in space exploration.
Other states that have space capabilities on a lesser scale are: Belgium, Canada, China, Den-
mark, France, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom, and West Germany. Grey, OMNI, July, 1988, 71-75.
79. For example, satellites are used to monitor weather changes throughout the world
and prevent catastrophes by providing warnings of severe storm systems. Leese, World Mete-
orological Organization-Demonstrated Accomplishments and Strong Plans for the Future in Ap-
plying Space Technology, 14 J. SPACE L. 140, 142 (1986).
80. See Japan: Government Plans Import Network To Simplify Purchases Of Goods By
Individual Consumers, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) (Aug. 23, 1989).
81. Galloway, Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celes-
tial Bodies, 5 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 481, 483 (1980); Cheng, supra note 13, at 214.
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Outer Space Treaty8 2 and other United Nations' space-related treaties
did not directly address the issue of space resource acquisition and
exploitation, several states proposed that a legal framework was
needed to deal with these matters.8 3 These states requested that a
study be made to develop a plan which would govern the exploitation
of space resources.
84
Argentina" offered the first proposed agreement in 1970.86 The
major provisions of this proposal heavily favored developing states.
The provisions specified: (1) that the term "natural resources" in-
cluded all substances originating on the moon and other celestial bod-
ies; (2) that these natural resources are the common heritage of
mankind;8 7 and (3) that the benefits from these resources are to be
made available to all peoples without discrimination. 88
In 1971, the Soviet Union proposed its own draft treaty concern-
ing the moon. 89 This proposal was much more narrowly focused than
Argentina's proposal. The Soviet Union's proposal applied only to
the moon and not to any other celestial bodies. 90 In addition, the plan
was noticeably silent on matters concerning the development of lunar
resources.91 Instead, the Soviet Union's draft treaty was primarily
concerned with ensuring peaceful exploration of the moon and pro-
tecting its surface and interior from sale, exchange or gift. 92
With these two proposals on the table, the United Nation's Com-
82. The Outer Space Treaty ("OST") was the first cooperative effort to regulate activities
of states in outer space. The OST is the primary United Nations' space treaty, and all other
treaties stem from the principles set forth in the OST. There are three guiding principles
running through the OST: (1) international law should apply to outer space activities; (2) space
should be free for exploration and use by all states; and (3) space should not be subject to
national appropriation or sovereignty claims. Raclin, From Ice to Ether: The Adoption of a
Regime to Govern Resource Exploitation in Outer Space, 7 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 727, 732
(1986).
83. See Bond, The Moon Treaty: Should the United States Become a Party?, 74 AM.
SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 152, 157 (1980).
84. Cheng, supra note 13, at 214.
85. It should be noted that Argentina does not presently have significant space capabili-
ties. See supra note 78.
86. Dula, Free Enterprise and the Proposed Moon Treaty, 2 Hous. J. INT'L L. 3, 7 (1980).
87. The common heritage of mankind principle was first devised in the Law of the Sea
Treaty. For an in-depth discussion on this issue, see Note, The Common Heritage of Mankind:
An Assessment, 14 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 509 (1982).
88. SENATE COMM., supra note 56, at 390.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 391.
91. Cheng, supra note 13, at 215.
92. Galloway, supra note 81, at 484.
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mittee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space ("COPUOS") and its sub-
committees93 began the process of drafting a treaty dealing with the
exploitation of space resources. 94 Numerous participating states, la-
boring both collectively and on their own, submitted proposals on
various issues relating to outer space resource development.
95
Despite considerable progress in early treaty negotiations, 96 pro-
gress slowed considerably between 1974 and 1978.9 7 The principal
barriers to further progress were: (1) whether the scope of the treaty
should include celestial bodies other than the moon; (2) the treaty's
notification procedures regarding missions to celestial bodies; and (3)
the creation of an international regime to govern the exploitation of
space resources. 98 Finally, on December 5, 1979, the United Nations
General Assembly adopted the treaty. 99 However, before the treaty
could become effective, United Nations' procedures required five
states to sign and ratify the treaty.1°° More than four years later, in
July 1984, the fifth state finally ratified the treaty.10
B. Criticism of the Moon Treaty
The Moon Treaty has generated a great deal of debate among
experienced scholars concerning its proper interpretation. These con-
flicting views are themselves an indication that the treaty is vague and
manipulable, which sets up an unworkable framework for regulating
resource development in outer space.
10 2
93. COPUOS consists of two subcommittees. The Legal Subcommittee is comprised
mainly of lawyers and diplomats. The Scientific and Technical Subcommittee is comprised of
delegates with technical expertise. Hosenball, supra note 14, at 96.
94. Cheng, supra note 13, at 214-15; Dula, supra note 86, at 7.
95. Working papers were submitted by Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Egypt,
France, India, Italy, Sweden, United Kingdom, and the United States. These papers focused
on a variety of topics, including the militarization of space, freedom of scientific investigation,
and sharing benefits of space resources. Galloway, supra note 81, at 485-86.
96. In 1972, the Legal Subcommittee drafted treaty language encompassing a preamble
and 21 articles, with consensus being achieved on many of these provisions. During 1973, six
more provisions were approved. SENATE COMM., supra note 56, at 391.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Comment, Space Law, 21 HARV. INT'L L.J. 579 (1980).
100. Christol, supra note 14, at 163.
101. Eleven nations signed the treaty prior to its enactment. These nations were: Austria,
Chile, France, Guatemala, India, Morocco, the Netherlands, Peru, the Philippines, Romania,
and Uruguay. Austria was the fifth state to ratify the treaty. The four other ratifying states
were: Chile, the Philippines, Uruguay, and the Netherlands. Christol, supra note 14, at 163.
102. One commentator observes: "The Moon Treaty is vague, lengthy, and complex.
Many of its critical terms are not well-defined." Dula, supra note 86, at 8.
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Three sections of the treaty are most troublesome. The majority
of the debate regarding the Moon Treaty focuses on article XI where
two of the most controversial sections are located and for this reason,
this article is considered the "Achilles heel" of the treaty. First, para-
graph 1 states, "the moon and its natural resources are the common
heritage of mankind."'' 0 3 Second, paragraph 5 calls for the establish-
mc. L u ani ItLLILaLIJlia LLli ..l. .• Lo %JV ii LIke the eAIoiLtI I LIt
natural resources of the moon as such exploitation is about to become
feasible." 1 4 The third troublesome section of the Moon Treaty that is
likely to weaken its authority is the "reservations clause."' 0 5 This
clause allows states to unilaterally amend the treaty prior to ratifica-
tion. 106 By making such reservations, a state can essentially re-draft
the treaty to suit its own particular interests. All other states who are
parties to the treaty thereafter become bound by these reservations. 107
The criticism of each of these three portions of the treaty are dis-
cussed below.
1. Article XI Paragraph 1 - The Notion of a Common Heritage
of Mankind
The idea that space resources belong to the "common heritage of
mankind" originated in Argentina's proposal to the United Na-
tions. 08 This concept was placed into the treaty following nine years
of debate by COPUOS 10 9 but nevertheless has continued to cause con-
fusion and disagreement." 10
The confusion primarily centers around the proper meaning of
the phrase "common heritage of mankind." How does one go about
affixing a meaning to this phrase? It sounds impressive and appears to
connote only the best of intentions. But one cannot easily reduce this
phrase to a structured enforceable principle. Although the common
heritage phrase is the heart of the Moon Treaty,"' its definition can-
103. Moon Treaty, supra note 10, art. XI, para. 1.
104. Id. para. 5.
105. The "reservations clause" does not refer to a particular provision in the treaty but is a
mechanism used in most United Nations treaties. Halket, supra note 12, at 274-77.
106. SENATE COMM., supra note 56, at 457-58.
107. Id. at 458.
108. Galloway, supra note 81, at 483.
109. See supra note 10. For the paragraph which contains the "common heritage of man-
kind" phrase, see infra note 113.
110. Dula, supra note 86, at 13-18; Halket, supra note 12, at 268-74.
111. Cheng, supra note 13, at 220.
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not be found in the treaty.11 2 Absent a clear definition in the Moon
Treaty itself, one could resort to other treaties that contain the same
provision for enlightenment. However, the terms of the Moon Treaty
explicitly prohibit venturing outside of the treaty to define its
terms.113 Instead, the treaty directs attention to article XI, paragraph
5 to give expression to the phrase. 1 14 Article XI, paragraph 5 states
that parties to the treaty should establish an international regime
which will enact procedures governing the exploitation of natural re-
sources on the moon.' 15 Consequently, the phrase "common heritage
of mankind" does not have meaning until an international regime is
set up to give it meaning." 16 The United Nations has yet to take any
steps to establish the international regime. As a result, the phrase
"common heritage of mankind" remains undefined.
However, paragraph 5 does pronounce that the international re-
gime will be created as exploitation of space resources becomes feasi-
ble. 117 At the time paragraph 5 was placed into the treaty, the
technology of locating and mining space resources did not exist.' 1 8
However, over the last eight years, much progress in space-based
technology has been made and we currently have the "know how" to
develop space resources."19
Presently, the situation seems to be at a standstill. The United
Nations has delayed establishing an international regime until a state
demonstrates the technological capacity to exploit space resources.
120
Concurrently, states are not likely to fully develop the necessary tech-
112. See Rosenfield, supra note 16, at 163.
113. The full text of Article XI, Paragraph I states: "The moon and its natural resources
are the common heritage of mankind, which finds its expression in the provisions of this
Agreement and in particular in paragraph 5 of this article." Moon Treaty, supra note 10, at
170.
114. Paragraph 5 is as follows:
States Parties to this Agreement hereby undertake to establish an international re-
gime, including appropriate procedures, to govern the exploitation of the natural re-
sources of the moon as such exploitation is about to become feasible. This provision
shall be implemented in accordance with article XVIII of this Agreement.
Id.
115. See infra note 130.
116. The United States' view of the meaning of the expression "common heritage of man-
kind" is that the expression has no obligatory meaning until the yet to be established interna-
tional regime gives it one. However, many other states believe the expression means "common
property." Rosenfield, supra note 16, at 163.
117. See infra note 130.
118. Rosenfield, A Moon Treaty? Yes, But Why Now?, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-
THIRD COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 69, 71 (1981).
119. SENATE COMM., supra note 56, at 419.
120. See supra note 114.
1990]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L[ 1
nology until some form of legal framework is set up which will pro-
tect their interests.
21
Developing states have little difficulty in interpreting the mean-
ing of the phrase "common heritage of mankind." To these states,
common heritage translates into common property. 22 Put simply,
these states believe that in outer space "everything" belongs to "eve-
ryone." If this interpretation is given effect, developing states, who,
incidentally, greatly outnumber states with space capabilities, will be
able to completely control the development of space resources due to
their superior voting power in the United Nations.1 23 Developing
states could choose which states or entities would be allowed to mine
space resources and subsequently manage the distribution of these re-
sources. However, this interpretation does not acknowledge the tre-
mendous financial and human investment by industrialized states
which has made space resource development a realistic possibility.
Through the use of semantics, the treaty drafters have made the
most controversial issues of the treaty appear benign. The treaty is
filled with aspirational phrases such as "[d]etermined to promote on
the basis of equality the further development of cooperation among
States," 124 "[t]he exploration and use of the moon shall be the prov-
ince of all mankind,"'' 25 and "[the moon and its natural resources are
the common heritage of mankind."'' 26 However, the treaty fails to
give substance to these statements and, as a result, is open to an infi-
nite number of conflicting interpretations.127 For this reason, space
law has been called "softlaw,"'' 28 and has led one commentator to
state:
As long as there is no supranational constitution, one can only
hope that the tendency to conceal unsolved legal problems under
beautiful legal phrases will be put to an end, and that the genera-
lized concepts will be replaced by more specific and substantial leg-
islation which might gradually coalesce into a practicable body of
rules. 129
121. SENATE COMM., supra note 56, at 440-42.
122. See generally, Rosenfield, supra note 16, at 163.
123. Id. at 167.
124. Moon Treaty, supra note 10, at preamble (emphasis added).
125. Id. art. IV, para. 1.
126. Id. art. XI, para. 1.
127. Bueckling, The Strategy of Semantics and the "Mankind Provisions" of the Space
Treaty, 7 J. SPACE L. 15, 17 (1979).
128. Id. at 18.
129. Id. at 22.
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2. Article XI Paragraph 5-The Notion of an International
Regime
As mentioned above, the Moon Treaty calls for the establishment
of an international regime to govern the exploitation of space re-
sources. 30 The treaty contemplates that once the technology exists to
develop space resources, the parties to the treaty will organize an in-
ternational regime to control development.'
3'
This language fuels two primary controversies. First, it is not
clear whether the treaty prohibits development of space resources
prior to the establishment of the international regime. 32 Second, the
regime's character and its breadth of authority presently is not
known, and will be settled only through the unpredictable negotiating
processes of the United Nations. 133 These two controversial areas are
examined below.
The treaty does not specifically state whether the international
regime must be established before space resources may be developed.
The absence of an explicit prohibition on resource development may
be interpreted as tacit approval for free unlimited exploitation.
34
However, the more likely interpretation is that the United Nations, in
130. The provisions that mention the organizing of an international regime are: (1) article
XI, para. 5, see supra note 114; (2) article XI, para. 6, which states the following:
In order to facilitate the establishment of the international regime referred to in para-
graph 5 of this article, States Parties shall inform the Secretary-General of the United
Nations as well as the public and the international scientific community to the great-
est extent feasible and practicable of any natural resources they may discover on the
moon; and
(3) article XI, para. 7 which states:
The main purposes of the international regime to be established shall include:
(a) The orderly and safe development of the natural resources of the moon;
(b) The rational management of those resources;
(c) The expansion of opportunities in the use of those resources; and
(d) An equitable sharing by all States Parties in the benefits derived from those
resources, whereby the interests and needs of the developing countries as well as the
efforts of those countries which have contributed either directly or indirectly to the
exploration of the moon shall be given special consideration.
Moon Treaty, supra note 10, at 170-71.
131. There are two schools of thought regarding whether the language of the Moon Treaty
requires the establishment of an international regime. One school of thought reads the interna-
tional regime language as aspirational. This view contends that treaty participants are not
obligated to set up an international regime, but should strive in good faith for its establishment.
SENATE COMM., supra note 56, at 455. The second school of thought is the more popular view
of article XI that obligates signatory states to establish an international regime when exploita-
tion becomes feasible. Id. at 454.
132. See Dula, supra note 86, at 10-11.
133. Rosenfield, supra note 16, at 164.
134. Id. at 16.
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not explicitly addressing this issue, has implicitly banned free
exploitation. 135
Presently, the Moon Treaty permits states to collect and remove
samples of lunar minerals and other substances. 136 This permission is
given to further interests in free scientific investigation., 37  Thus,
although a state has the "privilege" of travelling to the moon or an-
other celestial body, it can do so only for the limited purpose of col-
lecting samples for purely academic experiments.
Another drawback concerns the private sphere. No private com-
pany will be willing to make the required long-term investment in
space resource development if its potential returns would be unduly
speculative. 138 But, private companies are not averse to taking risks,
as long as they know the nature of those risks. 139 Thus, the lack of
rules or policies controlling development will probably deter many
private companies from risking the necessary capital even though they
have the financial and technological means of developing these
resources.
Proponents of the Moon Treaty claim that during the interim
period between ratification of the treaty and the establishment of an
international regime, states would not be forbidden from commer-
cially exploiting space resources.14° This position is allegedly fortified
by a unilateral statement made by Neil Hosenball, the Chief United
States representative to COPUOS. After COPUOS had reached a
135. Id. at 9-10. See also van Traa-Engelman, The Moon Treaty-Legal Consequences and
Practical Aspects, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-THIRD COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF
OUTER SPACE 73, 76 (1981).
136. Article VI, paras. I & 2 of the Moon Treaty. These paragraphs state:
1. There shall be freedom of scientific investigation on the moon by all States Parties
without discrimination of any kind, on the basis of equality and in accordance with
international law.
2. In carrying out scientific investigations and in furtherance of the provisions of this
Agreement, the States Parties shall have the right to collect on and remove from the
moon samples of its mineral and other substances. Such samples shall remain at the
disposal of those States Parties which caused them to be collected and may be used
by them for scientific purposes. States Parties shall have regard to the desirability of
making a portion of such samples available to other interested States Parties and the
international scientific community for scientific investigation. States Parties may in
the course of scientific investigations also use mineral and other substances of the
moon in quantities appropriate for the support of their missions.
Moon Treaty, supra note 10, at 168 (emphasis added).
137. Id. For the Moon Treaty paragraph which discusses the international regime, see
supra note 114.
138. Dula, supra note 86, at 16.
139. See generally, SENATE COMM., supra note 56, at 436-49.
140. Id. at 431.
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consensus on the terms of the treaty, Hosenball stated, "the draft
agreement ...places no moratorium upon the exploitation of the
natural resources on celestial bodies, pending the establishment of an
international regime."' 4' Proponents contend that this statement is
part of the treaty history, and since it was left uncontradicted, ex-
presses the true intention of the treaty drafters.
42
Hosenball's words are undoubtedly more clear than the crucial
paragraphs of the treaty itself. However, one must consider the po-
tency of his statement. The statement was made on the last day of the
COPUOS 1979 session after consensus was reached by the participat-
ing states. 43  Unilateral statements, made after an agreement is
reached, may be probative on the proper interpretation of the agree-
ment, but they can hardly be considered dispositive. 44
It may be possible for a state or private company to sidestep the
treaty paragraph and claim that all the activities the state is con-
ducting in outer space are in the interest of "scientific investigation."
With this approach the state could exploit space resources for com-
mercial purposes. However, this suggestion must fail. If any state
signs the treaty it must be willing to comply with all of the treaty
paragraphs as well as the spirit of the treaty. 45 Disguising commer-
cial exploitation as scientific investigation would be fraudulent and a
breach of the treaty.
46
Consider the following proposed provision: "States are free to
exploit the natural resources of the moon or any other celestial body,
prior to the establishment of the international regime." If the treaty
were originally drafted or amended to include the above provision,
what practical impact would this provision have, especially when read
141. See Dula, supra note 86, at 10.
142. Id.
143. SENATE COMM., supra note 56, at 432.
144. Id.
145. In the United States, treaties are governed by the Supremacy Clause in the Constitu-
tion. The Supremacy Clause states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursu-
ance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of
the United States shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI § 2 (emphasis added). The United States should be willing to comply with
the plain language as well as the spirit of its own treaties.
146. Notwithstanding the ethical unattractiveness of this suggestion, other problems exist.
For instance, United States tax and patent laws would interfere considerably with this proposi-
tion. Dula, supra note 86, at 19.
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in conjunction with existing treaty paragraphs? At first glance, one
might think that this language would represent the epitome of free
enterprise and would be favorable to private entities. But in reality
this provision would do little to alleviate the problem. This is be-
cause, at the present time, the definition of the international regime is
unclear.
A private company contemplating development of space re-
sources probably knows that at some future time, the parties to the
Moon Treaty will establish an international regime.1 47 The Moon
Treaty suggests some purposes to be served by the regime, 48 but the
scope of the regime's authority and the means that it can employ are
not clear. A private company can be relatively certain that the states
comprising the regime will very likely hold views in direct opposition
to its own. 149 A future regime will likely dilute, if not take control of,
the resource development of the company. 50 In addition, other fac-
tors beyond human control may influence whether industry will de-
cide to develop space resources.' 5' Thus, the uncertainty of a future
international regime serves to inhibit industry from making plans to
develop space resources today.
3. Reservations: A Good Idea?
If the United States undertakes to ratify the Moon Treaty, it may
possibly do so by specifying certain reservations or understandings. A
reservation allows a state to append declarations to the treaty which
express that state's interpretations of specific treaty provisions. 52 A
state may selectively comply with certain portions of the treaty. At
first glance, allowing a state to express its individual understanding
seems to be an acceptable method to reach a compromise. However,
this process hopelessly complicates the treaty. Theoretically, there
could be more versions of the treaty than there are states. The Aero-
space Law Division of the American Bar Association Section of Sci-
ence and Technology stated,
147. See Moon Treaty supra note 10. For the Moon Treaty paragraph which discusses the
international regime, see supra note 114.
148. Id.
149. See SENATE COMM., supra note 56, at 454-55.
150. See Dula, supra note 86, at 19.
151. Some of these factors are: (1) the long-term nature of space processing and manufac-
turing ventures; (2) the development of technology beyond that existing at this time; (3) the
necessity to obtain long-term financing; and (4) the necessity to increase the probability of
economic success for such ventures. SENATE COMM., supra note 56, at 442.
152. Halket, supra note 12, at 270.
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Ratification with reservations could make Moon Treaty relations
between the United States and other signatories uncertain and ex-
traordinarily complex. The number of possible permutations is
enormous. A complete analysis of all the potential relationships
would be impossible in any article of finite length.' 53
Such a system of unilateral amendments can only dilute the
treaty's authority. It would reduce the treaty to a series of individual
state agreements. More energy would be spent enforcing the treaty
than would be used to achieve its ends. Moreover, COPUOS recog-
nized that it was dealing with an entirely new area of human activity
and adopted consensus 54 voting because it was the only process capa-
ble of obtaining workable solutions to conflicting interests. 55 How-
ever, an agreement reached by hard work over long periods of time is
of little value if states can change the agreement with a simple unilat-
eral reservation.
In sum, the Moon Treaty is an agreement that addresses complex
issues of global importance. The attempt to pacify all states by using
aspirational terms with little substance fails to resolve the multitude
of conflicting interests. If the treaty allows states to unilaterally mod-
ify the treaty by reserving their objections, the treaty's effectiveness is
significantly lessened.
VI. TOWARD AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
It is easy to criticize the approach others have established to
manage the development of space resources. However, it is more
helpful to suggest an alternative approach. The remainder of this
Comment will discuss a new method which attempts to evenly bal-
ance the need to promote the development of space resources while
taking into account the need to provide states which lack a space pro-
gram the opportunity to share in the benefits of space development.
The need to locate and develop additional resources to supple-
ment local needs is not new. In earlier times, dwindling resource sup-
plies forced communities to search new lands to acquire fresh
resource reserves to satisfy their needs.' 56 Frequently, competition
for new resources caused hostility and forced persons to resort to self-
153. Id. at 277.
154. See supra note 14.
155. Hosenball, supra note 14, at 96.
156. See supra note 6.
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help to stake their claims to these new and valuable resources.' 57 To
curb the threat of violence and make for a more equitable distribution
of resources, legislatures and other governing bodies implemented
rules or laws to control the acquisition and development of these
resources. 5
8
The main difference between the present problem and past situa-
tions is that states now deal on a much larger scale. Instead of ventur-
ing to another part of the world to satisfy resource demands, states
are now venturing into outer space. This necessarily makes the un-
dertaking one of international significance.
With a few contemporary modifications, the reasonable use doc-
trine,159 which was developed from the concept of riparian rights, 160 is
well suited as a model to guide the development of space resources. It
has the needed characteristics of promoting the immediate exploita-
tion of space resources, while at the same time preserving the rights of
less-developed states to exploit these resources when they are ready.
VII. REASONABLE USE APPROACH
A. Background on Riparian Rights and the Emergence of the
Reasonable Use Doctrine
The doctrine of riparian rights pertains to our most valuable re-
source-water.'16  Because of the importance of water, schemes to
control its allocation are worth examining. A brief overview of the
principle elements of the riparian rights doctrine is presented below.
Riparianism is a common law doctrine which attempts to permit
the fullest beneficial use of rivers and streams.162 It gives the owners
of property, whose land is contiguous to a watercourse, certain water-
use rights. 163 Two distinct theories govern riparian uses.'
64
The first theory is known as "natural flow." Under this theory,
riparian owners may use the water as it passes through their land for
modest domestic uses, but must leave the watercourse substantially
157. Id.
158. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, ch. 41, Interference With the Use
of Water ("Riparian Rights") [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
159. See id. § 849, Topic 3. Interference with the Use of Watercourses and Lakes by Use of
the Water (1977).
160. See infra note 184 and accompanying text.
161. T. MCDONOUGH, supra note 5, at 100.
162. RESTATEMENT, supra note 158, ch. 41, Introductory Note and Scope Note to Chapter.
163. Id. at 181, 208.
164. Id. at 210-11.
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unchanged so that the natural flow of the watercourse past other ripa-
rian lands is not diminished. 165 Thus, an owner may not make a use
of adjoining water that would materially alter its quantity, quality or
velocity. 166 Such a use violates the natural flow theory even though it
may not interfere with another riparian owner's use of the water. 167
However, due to changing economic conditions and the advent
of the Industrial Revolution, the natural flow theory lost support.16 8
The consumption of water increased to keep up with irrigation needs
and the rapid growth of industries. 169 Thus, the main disadvantage to
the natural flow theory is that it left water untapped, prohibiting it
from being put to a beneficial use. 170
The second theory was developed in response to the inadequacies
of the natural flow theory. This new theory, the "reasonable use"
doctrine,17 1 grants a riparian owner the right to be free from unrea-
165. C. DONAHUE, JR., T. KAUPER & P. MARTIN, PROPERTY: AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE CONCEPT AND THE INSTITUTION 322 (1983) [hereinafter C. DONAHUE].
166. RESTATEMENT, supra note 158, at 210.
167. The legal consequences of the natural flow theory are:
(1) An unprivileged use of water that perceptibly depletes the volume of water on a
riparian proprietor's land violates that proprietor's right to the natural condition of
the water and is actionable by him, even though it interferes with no use that he is
making and causes him no tangible harm.
(2) The cause of action arises at the time the unprivileged use is made and the period
of prescription starts running from that time.
(3) If the unprivileged use is continuous, an injunction may properly be granted to
prevent the acquisition of a prescriptive right.
(4) Riparian privileges are limited to use of the water on or in connection with a use
of riparian land and consequently are not transferable apart from that land to
nonriparians. A grant purporting to make a transfer does not pass privileges as
against riparian proprietors; at most it bars the grantor from complaining of his
grantee's nonriparian use.
Id.
168. Id. at 209-10.
169. Id. at 210.
170. Id. at 209.
171. The legal consequences of this theory are:
(1) There is, in its strictest application, no primary right in anyone to have the natu-
ral integrity of a stream or lake maintained for its own sake. The primary right of a
riparian proprietor is to receive protection for his reasonable use of the stream or lake
from an unreasonable use by another.
(2) A use of water by a riparian proprietor, whether for riparian or nonriparian pur-
poses, is privileged if it does not cause harm to the existing reasonable use of another
riparian proprietor.
(3) There is no cause of action against one who is making a use unless it causes harm
or is otherwise unreasonable.
(4) One proprietor's use of all the water in a stream when others are making no use of
it would be reasonable.
(5) The period of prescription does not start to run until a use is harmed by an
unreasonable use.
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sonable uses of the watercourse by other riparian owners. 172 The goal
of this approach is to make full and beneficial use of a watercourse. 173
Water may be put to any use, so long as reasonable uses by other
riparian owners are not adversely affected. There is no set formula
that determines whether a use is reasonable or not. 174 When courts
are confronted with deciding whether a use is reasonable, they usually
apply a scheme that orders the preferred uses of the water.1 75 First
priority is given to satisfying domestic needs, 17 6 followed next by agri-
cultural uses, and finally industrial uses. 177
The last major legal system for controlling water use is the doc-
trine of "prior appropriation." The basic principle of this doctrine is
"first in time, first in right."' 178 This doctrine, which is not a true
theory of riparianism, was created out of necessity and adopted by
several western states with arid climates.179 Essentially, the first per-
son to beneficially use a watercourse has a superior right to its use
over subsequent appropriators.180 The need for such a doctrine arose
during the settlement of the western United States.' 8" Farmers not
having the luxury of a watercourse close to their land, were forced to
(6) There are no categorical limitations on the purposes for which a use may be
made.
(7) The riparian privileges of use, not being limited to use on or in connection with
the use of riparian land, may include reasonable nonriparian uses, and may to that
extent be transferred apart from the land to nonriparians.
Id. at 211.
172. Id. at 210.
173. Id.
174. C. DONAHUE, supra note 165, at 323.
175. An early case involving the reasonable use doctrine set out criteria to evaluate reason-
ableness and, since then, little has been added to this definition. The court stated that
[i]n determining what is a reasonable use, regard must be had to [1] the subject-
matter of the use; [2] the occasion and manner of its application; [3] the object, ex-
tent, necessity, and duration of the use; [4] the nature and size of the stream; [5] the
kind of business to which it is subservient; [6] the importance and necessity of the use
claimed by one party, and the extent of the injury to the other party; [7] the state of
improvement of the country in regard to mills and machinery, and the use of water
as a propelling power; [8] the general and established usages of the country in similar
cases; [9] and all the other and ever-varying circumstances of each particular case
bearing upon the question of the fitness and propriety of the use of the water under
consideration.
Red River Roller Mills v. Wright, 15 N.W. 167, 169 (Minn. 1883).
176. Domestic needs are generally thought to include the use of water for drinking, bath-
ing, cooking, and watering domestic animals.
177. C. DONAHUE, supra note 165, at 323.
178. RESTATEMENT, supra note 158, at 213.
179. Id.
180. J. DUKEMINIER & J. KRIER, PROPERTY 71 (1981).
181. RESTATEMENT, supra note 158, at 213.
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appropriate and divert existing watercourses in order to irrigate their
fields. A leading prior appropriation case reasoned, "[t]he doctrine of
priority of right by priority of appropriation for agriculture is evoked,
as we have seen, by the imperative necessity for artificial irrigation of
the soil. '"182 Without such a doctrine, the exploration and settlement
of the western United States would have occurred at a much slower
pace. 18 3
B. Application of the Reasonable Use Doctrine to the Development
of Space Resources
Of the three different water management schemes discussed
above, the reasonable use doctrine, because of its compromising na-
ture, is the scheme best suited to govern space resource development.
The doctrine has the potential for satisfying two main competing in-
terests. First, it encourages exploitation and stresses the use of re-
sources for beneficial purposes. 18 4 Second, it discourages unrestrained
space resource exploitation by making such exploitation subject to a
reasonableness standard. 8 5
Before attempting to apply the doctrine of reasonable use to the
environment of space, the reasons why the other theories of water
allocation are inadequate should be noted. The natural flow theory,
as applied to space resources, fails for the same reasons it failed dur-
ing the advent of the Industrial Revolution. Its primary tenet is to
leave resources substantially unchanged.' 8 6  This tenet completely
conflicts with the reason states desire to exploit space resources.
States typically strive to develop space resources and put them to use
182. Coffin v. The Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882). In this case, Left Hand Ditch
had diverted water from the St. Vrain Creek to use for irrigating its fields which were located a
considerable distance from the creek. Coffin was a riparian owner who owned property on the
St. Vrain downstream from where Left Hand Ditch had previously diverted the water. In
1879, the supply of water was inadequate to supply both Coffin and Left Hand Ditch. Coffin
took matters into his own hands and tore down the ditches that diverted water to Left Hand
Ditch's land, thus increasing the supply of water to himself. Left Hand Ditch brought suit.
The Colorado Supreme Court rejected Coffin's contention that the state followed the common
law principles of riparian proprietorship. Instead, the court adopted the doctrine of priority of
right to water by priority of appropriation. Under that doctrine, one who appropriates water
from a natural stream for a beneficial purpose has a superior right to the use of that water. To
deny this right, the court found, would deny Left Hand Ditch a greater part of the value of its
property. Id.
183. C. DONAHUE, supra note 165, at 323.
184. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 157-161 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 151-152 and accompanying text.
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either on earth or in other space-based projects. 87 Doing so would
inevitably reduce the quantity or quality of the space resources as they
originally existed.
Initially, it may seem that the doctrine of prior appropriation
could be applicable to developing space resources. The doctrine cer-
tainly has appeal for those states that have space capabilities.188 Ar-
guably, those states that expend the time and money to locate and
develop resources should have a superior right to those resources.
However, this doctrine fails when applied to the environment of space
because it ignores the interests of less-developed states that do not
have space capabilities. Allowing those states with the capability to
develop space resources to freely appropriate those resources without
limitations would effectively prohibit the less-developed states from
ever benefitting from those resources. Such a system would breed
hostility.
The reasonable use doctrine seems better suited to control the
development of space resources. There are close parallels between the
times that gave rise to that doctrine and present times. The mid-
1800s, during which the reasonable use doctrine came into existence,
was a time of emerging technology. As the Industrial Revolution
progressed, there was a marked increase in the consumption of water
which heavily burdened local reserves. 89 Currently, due to rising
consumption, resource reserves are again being overburdened. This
time, however, it is on a global scale.' 90
One advantage that the reasonable use doctrine has over the
United Nations' approach in the Moon Treaty is that it has a proven
track record. The doctrine has been time-tested for being able to
peacefully manage the allocation of water resources among persons
with competing interests.
As applied in space, the reasonable use doctrine would allow a
state to stake claim to resources, depending upon that state's purpose
and whether other states would be harmed by the exploitation. The
entity that decides what a reasonable use is would have to establish
guidelines for this purpose. Adopting the guidelines used by courts
when originally applying the reasonable use doctrine would be
187. SENATE COMM., supra note 56, at 418-19.
188. See supra note 178.
189. J. DUKEMINIER & J. KRIER, supra note 180, at 65.
190. See supra notes 53-76 and accompanying text.
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helpful. 9 1
For example, one guideline could require that a state which ex-
ploits space resources in order to decrease its reliance on terrestrial
resources would be considered a reasonable use. This use would bene-
fit all states and would augment resources on earth by allowing re-
newable resources additional time to fully recharge. In addition, non-
renewable resources will last longer because of the new supplies avail-
able in space. Other uses may not be viewed as favorably. For exam-
ple, the use of space resources for solely space-based projects may not
garner as much support. Most states would probably adhere to the
view that any exploitation of space resources should benefit earth first,
with other uses being assigned a lesser priority. Under the reasonable
use doctrine, no state would be allowed to simply stake a claim to a
portion of the moon or an asteroid, and may not prevent others from
exploiting the resources found there. Letting resources sit idle would
be declared a per se unreasonable use. This provision would comply
with the Moon Treaty's principle of non-appropriation.1 92 For in-
stance, a space power could not legitimately exclude others from their
claim to a portion of a celestial body. To obtain any benefit, the space
power must develop the resources and put them to a reasonable use.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The earth's population is increasing at an explosive rate and, not
surprisingly, the world's consumption of natural resources is also in-
creasing. At the same time, the earth's natural resources are growing
191. The Restatement of Torts states:
The determination of the reasonableness of a use of water depends upon a considera-
tion of the interests of the riparian proprietor making the use, of any riparian propri-
etor harmed by it and of society as a whole. Factors that affect the determination
include the following:
(a) the purpose of the use,
(b) the suitability of the use to the watercourse or lake,
(c) the economic value of the use,
(d) the social value of the use,
(e) the extent and amount of the harm it causes,
(f) the practicality of avoiding the harm by adjusting the use or method of use of one
proprietor or the other,
(g) the practicality of adjusting the quantity of water used by each proprietor,
(h) the protection of existing values of water uses, land investments and enterprises,
and
(i) the justice of requiring the use causing harm to bear the loss.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 158, § 850A.
192. The Moon Treaty, article XI, para. 2 states: "The moon is not subject to national
appropriation by any claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other
means." Moon Treaty, supra note 10, at 170.
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scarce, with some at dangerously low levels. Attempts to curb con-
sumption and conserve resources, although admirable, are not suffi-
cient long-term solutions to this pressing problem.
The international community needs to lessen its reliance on the
earth in order to meet its resource demands. A new and richer source
of natural resources must be found. Preliminary exploration of the
moon and other celestial bodies indicates that the frontier of outer
space may hold the answer to the growing resource problem.
The international community should encourage states to make
space resource exploitation a reality. The Moon Treaty does little to
encourage such exploitation due to its vagueness and failure to recog-
nize that states who take the financial and physical risk to develop
these resources need to be fully compensated for their efforts. The
application of the reasonable use doctrine to guide space resource de-
velopment ensures that those resources will be developed with the in-
terests of all states in mind.
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